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Auctioning Securities
Lawrence M. Ausubel and Peter Cramton
1 Introduction
The standard analysis of the Treasury auction has contrasted two particular auction formats: the pay-
your-bid auction (also known as the discriminatory auction); and the uniform-price auction (also known
as the nondiscriminatory or competitive auction). The pay-your-bid auction has been the traditional
method of auctioning Treasury securities; authors beginning with Milton Friedman (1960) have argued
the superiority of the uniform-price auction. Today, uniform-price auctions are used for issuing two-year,
five-year, and inflation-adjusted U.S. Treasury securities, while pay-your-bid auctions are used for issuing
three-month, six-month, one-year, three-year, ten-year, and thirty-year Treasury securities.
The recent academic literature on the Treasury auction has generally taken three directions. First,
Chari and Weber (1992) have drawn upon analogy with the theory of auctions of a single item to argue
the superiority of the uniform-price auction. Second, Wilson (1979), Maxwell (1983), Back and Zender
(1993), and Wang and Zender (1996) have modeled the uniform-price auction as “share auctions” and
demonstrated that there exist a multiplicity of equilibria, some of which yield the seller very low
revenues. Third, Malvey, Archibald and Flynn (1996) and Reinhart and Belzer (1996) have used the
Treasury's recent experiment with uniform pricing to compare the pay-your-bid and uniform-price
formats.
The current paper takes a substantially-different direction. We begin with the observation that there
is only an imperfect analogy between the second-price auction of a single item and the uniform-price
auction of multiple items. The flaw in the analogy is that, with private values, sincere bidding is a weakly-
dominant strategy in the second-price auction of a single item,1 but is not even an equilibrium strategy in
the uniform-price auction of multiple items (Ausubel and Cramton 1996). However, the analogy is
restored if we instead consider the multi-unit Vickrey auction (Vickrey 1961). Hence, it seems natural —
rather than contrasting the pay-your-bid format with the uniform-price format — to set our sights on the
Vickrey auction as a superior, sealed-bid auction for securities.
We continue with the observation that there is also only an imperfect analogy between the English
auction of a single item and the standard ascending-bid auction of multiple items. Again, the flaw in the
                                                     
1 To be more precise, sincere bidding is a weakly-dominant strategy in the ascending-clock version of the English
auction: the auctioneer continuously raises the price, bidders signify whether they remain in the auction, and the
auction ends when only one bidder remains in the auction. Sincere bidding is not a weakly-dominant strategy when
bidders name their bids (Avery 1998).
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analogy is that, with private values, sincere bidding is a weakly-dominant strategy of the English auction
of a single item, but is not an equilibrium strategy in the standard ascending-bid auction of multiple items.
However, the analogy is restored if we instead consider the alternative ascending-bid auction proposed by
Ausubel (1997). Whereas the Joint Report on the Government Securities Market (1992) advocated
exploration of the standard ascending-bid auction, it seems more natural to investigate the alternative
ascending-bid auction as a dynamic auction design for securities.
Once the proper analogies are developed, our paper is patterned closely after the prior literature on
single-item auctions. When symmetric bidders for a single item have a pure common value and common
uncertainty, the unique equilibrium in undominated strategies of the second-price auction maximizes the
seller's expected revenues (subject to not using any reserve price). Similarly, here, we show that when
symmetric bidders for multiple items have a pure common value and common uncertainty, the unique
equilibrium in undominated strategies of the Vickrey auction maximizes the seller's expected revenues
(subject to not using any reserve price). Furthermore, just as the English auction of a single item achieves
the same outcome in this context as the second-price auction, the alternative ascending-bid auction
achieves the same outcome in this context as the Vickrey auction.
When symmetric bidders for a single item have a pure common value, and when they receive
strictly-affiliated signals of that value, Milgrom and Weber (1982) proved that the first-price auction
yields less expected revenue than the second-price auction, which in turn yields less expected revenue
than the English auction. By virtually the same argument, we show that all symmetric equilibria of the
pay-your-bid auction for multiple items yields less expected revenue than the simple equilibrium of the
Vickrey auction. Furthermore, the seller's most-preferred equilibrium of the uniform-price auction
coincides with the simple equilibrium of the Vickrey auction. Finally, the simple equilibrium of the
Vickrey auction in turn yields less revenue than the simple equilibrium of the alternative ascending-bid
auction.
One might imagine that the distinction between uniform and Vickrey pricing is of little empirical
importance in Treasury auctions, because Treasury auctions are too competitive for strategic factors to
play an important role. However, the empirical reality is that Treasury auctions are dominated by a
handful of large bidders. The top five primary dealers typically buy one-half of the issue in U.S. Treasury
auctions (Malvey, et al. 1996). Auctions in other important settings, such as radio spectrum and electric
power, also involve large bidders with significant market power.
Our paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we present the model and define the various auction
formats studied herein. In Section 3, we obtain results for the special case when there is no private
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information. In Section 4, we obtain results when bidders receive affiliated private signals. We conclude
in Section 5 by asking the additional question: “Why are not IPO's sold by auction?”
2 The Model and Auction Formats
2.1 The Model
We consider a homogeneous security such as a government bond, a tradeable emissions permit, or a
share of a company's stock. For analytic convenience, we assume that the security is arbitrarily divisible,
so that any quantity between zero and the total available supply may be purchased. Without loss of
generality, we normalize the total available supply to equal one, so that any quantity q ∈ [0,1] may be
purchased.
We analyze a situation where the security has a pure common value. The random variable
representing the pure common value is denoted V and the realization of the random variable is denoted v.
Bidders are assumed to be risk neutral, so that the (ex post) payoff of bidder i (i = 1,…,n) who purchases
quantity qi of the security at a unit price of p equals (v − p) qi.
Each of the n bidders potentially receives private information about the common value. The random
variable representing bidder i's signal is denoted Si, and the realization of the random variable is denoted
si. We assume that each Si is real valued, with support on the interval [ , ]s s . Furthermore, let
S ≡ (S1,…,Sn) denote the vector of random variables and let s ≡ (s1,…,sn) denote the vector of realizations.
Let f(v,s) denote the joint probability density of the common value and the bidders' signals. We will
generally make the following assumptions:
ASSUMPTION 1. The expectation of V is finite: EV < ∞.
ASSUMPTION 2. The random variables V, S1,…,Sn are affiliated: For every (v,s) ≡ (v,s1,…,sn) and
(v′,s′) ≡ (v′,s1′,…,sn′), we have:
(1) f v v s s f v v s s f v s f v s( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )∨ ′ ∨ ′ ∧ ′ ∧ ′ ≥ ′ ′ ,
where z z z z∧ ′ ∨ ′( )  denotes the component-wise maximum (minimum) of z and z′.
ASSUMPTION 3. f(⋅,⋅,…,⋅) is symmetric in its last n arguments.
The assumption of affiliation is standard in the auctions literature, following Milgrom and Weber
(1982). For readers not familiar with this notion, it may be useful to think of affiliation as non-negative
correlation. When inequality (1) is satisfied with strict inequality, the condition will be referred to as strict
affiliation, which may also be thought of as positive correlation.
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The interpretation of affiliation is natural in the context of securities auctions. Affiliation means that,
if bidder i were to infer that bidder j had received a higher signal than previously believed, then bidder i
would not reduce its estimate of the common value of the security. Moreover, strict affiliation means that,
if bidder i were to infer that bidder j had received a higher signal than previously believed, then bidder i
would increase its estimate of the common value of the security.
Assumption 1 is required to assure that equilibrium auction prices are finite. Assumption 3 is
required for the existence of symmetric equilibria to be plausible.
2.2 Sealed-Bid Auction Formats
In a multi-unit sealed-bid auction, bidders can be thought to each submit several bids, which are
honored in descending order of price. Equivalently, bidders can be thought to each submit downward-
sloping demand curves.
To be more precise, each bidder i submits a bid function bi(q):[0,1]→[0,∞), which is required to be
right continuous and weakly decreasing. From bi(q), the auctioneer can construct an equivalent demand
function qi(p), which specifies the quantity bidder i demands at the price p, and which is left continuous
and weakly decreasing with qi(0) = 1. (See also Ausubel and Cramton 1996, p. 8.) In all the sealed-bid
formats we consider, the securities are assigned to the highest bids, until the supply of the security is
exhausted. However, the auction formats will differ in the payment rules. The stop-out price, denoted p0,
is defined by:




=∑inf | ( ){ } .
If Σ i iq p( )0 = 1, then each bidder i receives qi(p0). If Σ i iq p( )0  > 1, then the aggregate demand curve is
flat at p0 and some bidders' demands at p0 must be rationed. If there is just a single bidder whose demand
curve is flat at p, then this bidder's quantity is reduced by Σ i iq p( )0 − 1. If there are multiple bidders with
demand curves flat at p0, then quantity is allocated by proportionate rationing.
We are now ready to define the various sealed-bid auction formats. For expositional simplicity, we
assume in the following definitions that the aggregate demand curve is not flat at p0, so that there is no
need for our notation to reflect any rationing. The traditional format used for the auctioning of Treasury
securities is the pay-your-bid auction (also known as the discriminatory auction); bidders are awarded the
quantity demanded at the stop-out price and pay their bids which exceed the stop-out price.
PAY-YOUR-BID AUCTION. Bidders simultaneously and independently submit (sealed) bid functions
bi(q) (with equivalent demand curves of qi(p)), each bidder i is assigned the quantity qi(p0), and each
bidder i is charged a payment Pi corresponding to its actual bids above the stop-out price p0:
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(3) P b q dqi i
q pi= z ( )( )0 0 .
Drawing analogy from competitive markets, Milton Friedman (1960) proposed the uniform-price
auction; bidders are awarded the quantity demanded at the stop-out price and everyone pays this market-
clearing price for each unit bought.
UNIFORM-PRICE AUCTION. Bidders simultaneously and independently submit (sealed) bid functions
bi(q) (with equivalent demand curves of qi(p)); each bidder i is assigned the quantity qi(p0); and each
bidder i is charged a payment Pi based on the stop-out price p0:
(4) P q p pi i= ( )0 0 .
William Vickrey (1961) proposed what is now known as the Vickrey auction. Bidders are awarded
the quantity demanded at the stop-out price and pay the opportunity cost of the award — the best rejected
bids of the other bidders. The Vickrey pricing rule is famous in the private value setting, since then it is a
dominant strategy for each bidder to bid its true value, which results in an efficient allocation. In a
common value setting, the dominant strategy result typically is lost, but the pricing rule is still well
defined.
VICKREY AUCTION. Bidders simultaneously and independently submit (sealed) bid functions bi(q)
(with equivalent demand curves of qi(p)), each bidder i is assigned the quantity qi(p0), and each bidder i is
charged a payment Pi corresponding to the opportunity cost of its bids
(5) P b q dqi iq pi
= −−z ( )( )11 0 ,
where b−i(q) denotes the aggregate bid function of all bidders j (j ≠ i), i.e., the inverse of
q p q pi jj i− ≠= ∑( ) ( ) . Equivalently, the payment rule may instead be written directly in terms of the
demand curves: P q p p q x dxi i ip
p
i
= − − −
−
z( ) [ ( )]0 0 10  where p−i is the stop-out price if bidder i did not bid.
The payment rule of the Vickrey auction is easiest understood within the context of an auction for M
indivisible items. There, the payment rule reduces to: bidder i pays the highest-rejected bid for the first
item it wins, the second-highest rejected bid for the second item it wins, etc., where the enumeration of
rejected bids for calculating bidder i's payment always excludes the bids of bidder i.
2.3 Ascending-Clock Auction Formats
In the dynamic auction formats studied here, the auctioneer can be thought to name a price p, bidders
respond by each naming the quantity which they demand at that price, the auctioneer then increments the
price, bidders again respond by each naming the quantity which they demand at the incremented price,
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and the process continues until the aggregate demand is less than or equal to the price. Any such auction
format may be referred to as an ascending-clock auction.
To be more precise, each bidder i indicates a quantity, qi(p), demanded at price p, and the price is
incremented until the final price, denoted p0, is reached, where p0 is defined by




=∑inf | ( ){ } .
As in the definition of the sealed-bid auction formats, if Σ i iq p( )0 = 1, then each bidder i receives qi(p0),
but if Σ i iq p( )0 > 1, then some bidders' demands at p0 will need to be rationed.
We are now ready to define two dynamic auction formats. For expositional simplicity, we will
assume in the following definitions that the aggregate demand curve is not flat at p0, so that there is no
need for our notation to reflect any rationing. The Joint Report on the Government Securities Market
(1992) advocated exploration of the ascending-clock auction with a uniform-price rule: bidders are
awarded the quantity demanded at the final price, and pay a unit price equaling the final price.
STANDARD ASCENDING-BID AUCTION. Bidders simultaneously report nonincreasing demands qi(p)
according to an ascending clock until a final price of p0 is reached, where there is no excess demand. Each
bidder i is then assigned the quantity qi(p0), and each bidder i is charged a unit price equaling the final
price p0.
Drawing analogy from the English auction of a single item, Ausubel (1997) recently proposed a new
dynamic auction whose static representation is the Vickrey auction: bidders are awarded the quantity
demanded at the final price, but pay according to the prices at which they “clinch” units.
ALTERNATIVE ASCENDING-BID AUCTION. Bidders simultaneously report nonincreasing demands
qi(p) according to an ascending clock until a final price of p0 is reached. At “each” price p until the final
price, and for each remaining bidder i, the auctioneer calculates
(7) C p A p q pi j
j i




where A(p) denotes the available supply remaining at price p. Bidder i is deemed to have “clinched” Ci(p)
units at a price of p. The available supply is then updated by subtracting out from A(p) and bidder i's
remaining demand is updated by subtracting out Ci(p) from qi(p). Bidder i is thus awarded a quantity of
qi(p0) for a total payment of
(8) P C p pdpi i
p
= z ( )0 0 .
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The reader may be wondering — for completeness — if there is a dynamic auction corresponding to
the pay-your-bid auction. Thus, we conclude this section by remarking that, just as the first-price auction
of a single item is strategically equivalent to the descending-bid dynamic auction (known in the
economics literature as the Dutch auction), it is possible to define a descending-bid auction for multiple
items which is equivalent to the pay-your-bid auction. However, this auction will not be studied here.
3 Results for Bidders without Private Information
In this section, we consider a model where bidders receive no private signals. Formally, this is a
special case of the model of Section 2, where for every bidder i, the signal Si is independent of the pure
common value V. Thus, bidders are symmetrically informed.
Wilson (1979) first considered this model, demonstrating the existence of equilibria of the uniform-
price auction which yield the seller low revenues. Maxwell (1983) established a folk theorem for the
uniform price auction: for any level of revenues below some maximum, there exists an equilibrium of the
uniform-price auction yielding this level of revenues. Back and Zender (1993) argued that Wilson's
equilibrium for this case is fragile, since the equilibrium quantities are deterministic, and so each bidder's
bid function is only required to be optimal at a single quantity. They introduced stochastic supply
(motivated by a random number of noncompetitive bids in the Treasury auction), and proved that a folk
theorem for the uniform-price auction still holds. Wang and Zender (1996) further demonstrate the
existence of multiple equilibria in the pay-your-bid auction.
The intuition for low-revenue equilibria in the uniform-price auction is compelling. In a uniform-
price auction, the inframarginal part of the demand curve is irrelevant to the bidder. However, how by
submitting a steep demand curve, the bidder increases the cost to other bidders of grabbing extra quantity.
Thus, steep demand curves enforce a low price by making the marginal cost of asking for more arbitrarily
large. Although the intuition is clearest in the case without uncertainty, Back and Zender (1993) show that
it extends to a setting with uncertain supply.
We begin by restating the existing results on the uniform-price and pay-your-bid auctions.
PROPOSITION 3.1 (Wilson 1979, Maxwell 1983, Back and Zender 1993). For the pure common value
model without private information, there exists a multiplicity of equilibria in the uniform-price auction,
even if weakly-dominated strategies are eliminated and if stochastic supply is introduced. In the
equilibrium with highest revenues, the seller's revenues equal EV.
PROPOSITION 3.2 (Wang and Zender 1996). For the pure common value model without private
information, there exists a multiplicity of equilibria in the pay-your-bid auction, even if weakly-
9
dominated strategies are eliminated and if stochastic supply is introduced. In the equilibrium with highest
revenues, the seller's revenues equal EV.
Both the uniform-price and pay-your-bid auctions offer the possibility of raising revenues equal to
the full expected value of the securities, but they also exhibit other equilibria which yield much lower
revenues. Indeed, Back and Zender (1993) and Wang and Zender (1996) argue on Pareto grounds that the
symmetric equilibria which minimize the seller's revenue are the most plausible.
By contrast, the Vickrey auction in this case offers a unique equilibrium, and it maximizes the
seller's revenue, as we see in the following theorem:
THEOREM 3.3. For the pure common value model without private information:
(a) the Vickrey auction exhibits a unique equilibrium which survives elimination of weakly-dominated
strategies;
(b) the Vickrey auction exhibits a unique symmetric equilibrium consistent with stochastic supply over
the interval [0,1]; and
(c) this equilibrium revenue-dominates all equilibria of all auction formats consistent with voluntary
bidder participation.
PROOF.
(a) We will show that the bid function bi(q) = EV, for all q ∈ (0,1], weakly dominates all other bid
functions in the Vickrey auction. Consider any other bid function bi′(⋅), and compare the payoffs of bi and
bi′ to bidder i against any aggregate bid function, b−i(⋅), of the other bidders. Let qi denote the quantity
awarded to bidder i from bi and b−i, and let qi ′ denote the quantity awarded to bidder i from bi′ and b−i. If
qi ′ < qi, observe from Eq. (5) that bidder i is charged the same price for the quantity qi ′ under either bid
function; however, using bi, bidder i also receives quantity qi − qi ′ for a unit price of at most EV, so bi
yields bidder i the same or higher payoff as bi′. Similarly, if qi ′ > qi, observe from Eq. (5) that bidder i is
charged the same price for the quantity qi under either bid function; however, using bi′, bidder i also
receives quantity qi ′ − qi for a unit price of at least EV, so bi again yields bidder i the same or higher
payoff as bi′.
(b) With stochastic supply over the interval [0,1], in any symmetric equilibrium, any point on the bid
function bi(q), q ∈ [0,1/n], may be pivotal. If bi(q) ≠ EV, for any q ∈ [0,1/n], any bidder can profitably
deviate by setting its bid uniformly equal to EV, by the same calculation as in part (a).
(c) Since the security has a pure common value, the sum of the bidders' expected values derived from
the security equals EV in any equilibrium. Hence, in any equilibrium of any auction consistent with
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voluntary bidder participation, the sum of the bidders' expected payments may be at most EV. This
maximum is attained by the Vickrey auction. n
The Vickrey auction, once weakly-dominated strategies are eliminated, avoids the indeterminacy of
the uniform-price auction. We see that the dominant strategy argument extends to the case of a divisible
good. A bidder's demand curve does not affect how much the bidder pays, nor does it affect the incentives
of the other bidders. The bidder simply wishes to win units whenever the price is below its value, and
hence bids EV for all units.
Now, let us briefly consider the two ascending-clock auction formats. If bidders are provided no bid
information, i.e. if they are told after each price only whether the auction has yet reached the final price,
then the standard ascending-bid auction is strategically equivalent to the uniform-price auction and the
alternative ascending-bid auction is strategically equivalent to the Vickrey auction. We thus have:
COROLLARY 3.4. For the pure common value model without private information:
(a) there exists a multiplicity of equilibria in the standard ascending-bid auction with no bid information
— even if weakly-dominated strategies are eliminated and if stochastic supply is introduced — and
the seller's revenues are bounded above by EV;
(b) the alternative ascending-bid auction with no bid information exhibits a unique equilibrium which
survives elimination of weakly-dominated strategies, as well as a unique symmetric equilibrium
consistent with stochastic supply over the interval [0,1]; and
(c) this equilibrium revenue-dominates all equilibria of all auction formats consistent with voluntary
bidder participation.
4 Results for Bidders with Affiliated Private Signals
In this section, we consider the full model of Section 2. Every bidder i (i = 1,…,n) receives a signal
Si, and the random variables V,S1,…,Sn are affiliated. Thus, the bidders possess private information, and
bidder j's private information is relevant to the assessment of bidder i's value. The model is a
generalization of the frameworks considered by Wilson (1979) and Back and Zender (1993).
Most or all of the auction formats exhibit a multiplicity of equilibria for this model. However, there
exist bounds on the set of equilibria provided by the theory of auctions of single items. In particular, the
revenue of all equilibria of the pay-your-bid auction is bounded above by the revenue of the first-price
auction for a single item; the revenue of all equilibria of the uniform-price and Vickrey auctions are
bounded above by the revenue of the second-price auction for a single item; and the revenue of all
equilibria of the standard ascending-bid and alternative ascending-bid auctions are bounded above by the
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revenue of the English auction for a single item. Under the assumption of affiliation, these respective
upper bounds may be ranked. In addition, as in the case of no private bidder information, the Vickrey
auction reduces the multiplicity of equilibria of the uniform-price auction, and the alternative ascending-
bid auction reduces the multiplicity of equilibria of the standard ascending-bid auction.
In order to state our results, it is helpful to define the following standard notation. Let the first-order
statistic, S(1), of S1,…,Sn be defined by: S(1) = max{S1,…,Sn}. Let the second-order statistic, S(2), be defined
by: S(2) = max{{S1,…,Sn}\{S(1)}}.
PROPOSITION 4.1. For the pure common value model with affiliated private signals, the following is
a symmetric equilibrium of the pay-your-bid auction: Each bidder i submits a flat bid function,
bi(q;si) = bi(si), for q ∈ [0,1], where bi(si) is the symmetric equilibrium of the first-price auction of a single
item. [Conjecture: Moreover, the expected revenues of this equilibrium constitute an upper bound on the
revenues of all symmetric equilibria of the pay-your-bid auction.]
PROPOSITION 4.2. For the pure common value model with affiliated private signals, the following is
a symmetric equilibrium of the uniform-price auction and the Vickrey auction: Each bidder i submits a
flat bid function, bi(q;si) = E{V | S(1) = si, S(2) = si}, for q ∈ [0,1], which corresponds to the symmetric
equilibrium of the second-price auction of a single item. [Conjecture: Moreover, the expected revenues of
this equilibrium constitute an upper bound on the revenues of all symmetric equilibria of the uniform-
price auction and Vickrey auctions.]
PROPOSITION 4.3. For the pure common value model with affiliated private signals, the following is
a symmetric equilibrium of the standard ascending-bid auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction:
Each bidder i demands a quantity q(p; si) = 1, until the same circumstances occur under which it drops out
of the corresponding English auction of a single item, and then it demands a quantity q(p; si) = 0.
[Conjecture: Moreover, the expected revenues of this equilibrium constitute an upper bound on the
revenues of all symmetric equilibria of the standard ascending-bid and alternative ascending-bid
auctions.]
The equilibria in these propositions are simple in that each bidder is submitting a flat bid function for
the entire quantity available. As a result, a bidder wins either all or none of the issue. Moreover, the
residual supply curve is flat for all quantities between 0 and 1. The existence of these simple equilibria
depends on the assumption that each bidder can purchase the entire quantity available. If, instead, bidder i
has a capacity λi < 1, then flat bid functions are not possible in equilibrium, except when all bidders have
the same capacity (λi = λ for all i) and 1/λ is an integer. In this special case, if all bidders submit flat bid
functions, each bidder will face a flat residual supply curve for its entire capacity.
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THEOREM 4.4. For the pure common value model with (strictly) affiliated private signals, the
expected revenue of the equilibrium of Proposition 4.1 is (strictly) less than the expected revenue of the
equilibrium of Proposition 4.2, which in turn is (strictly) less than the expected revenue of the equilibrium
of Proposition 4.3.
PROOF. The first inequality follows directly from the same argument as Milgrom and Weber (1982,
Theorem 15). The second inequality follows directly from the same argument as Milgrom and Weber
(1982, Theorem 11). n
CONJECTURE 4.5. For the pure common value model with affiliated private signals:
(a) the Vickrey auction eliminates some of the indeterminacy of the uniform-price auction (at the lower
end of revenues); and
(b) the alternative ascending-bid auction eliminates some of the indeterminacy of the standard ascending-
bid auction (at the lower end of revenues).
PROOF.
(a) It is a weakly-dominated strategy in the Vickrey auction for any bidder to bid less than
b q s E V S s S si ( ; ) | ,( ) ( )= = =1 2n s , for q ∈ [0,1]. Consequently, the interim utility of a bidder receiving a
signal of s (the lowest-possible signal) is forced to equal zero, in any equilibrium surviving elimination of
weakly-dominated strategies. This bound is not present in equilibria of the uniform-price auction (Wilson
1979, Back and Zender 1993).
 (b) Follows by similar reasoning. n
We further conjecture that stronger results reducing the multiplicity of equilibria in the Vickrey
auction and alternative ascending-bid auction may be obtained. Indeed, there is some possibility that the
equilibrium of the Vickrey auction displayed in Proposition 4.2 may be the unique symmetric equilibrium
surviving elimination of weakly-dominated strategies.
5 Conclusion
In any securities auction in which bidders possess private information, one should expect there to be
“underpricing,” in the sense that the seller's expected revenues should be less than the expected value of
the securities being auctioned. This is a direct consequence of the bidders obtaining informational rents
from their private information. The seller's interest, then, should be to adopt an auction for securities that
limits the extent of underpricing.
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We have seen in this paper that the Vickrey auction and the alternative ascending-bid auction have
theoretical advantages over the pay-your-bid auction and uniform-price auction, which are currently used
to sell government securities. When bidders do not have private information, underpricing is eliminated
by a Vickrey or alternative ascending-bid auction. When bidders have private information, then the extent
of underpricing is reduced with Vickrey and alternative ascending-bid formats.
Given the empirical fact that underpricing in the U.S. Treasury auctions is small, the potential gains
from a change in the auction format are modest. Still, a reduction in borrowing costs of even one basis
point on a gross public debt of more than $5 trillion (of which approximately $3.4 trillion is in private
hands) is not something to entirely disregard.
However, in the case of initial public offerings of corporate stock, the magnitude of underpricing
under current American practice appears to be vastly larger than necessary. The substantial underpricing
is indicative of a badly-performing mechanism for selling new issues. Hence, we conclude this paper by
raising the question: “Why are IPO's not done instead by an efficient auction?”
As an example, let us consider an IPO such as Netscape, where it is known in advance that the IPO
will be vastly oversubscribed at the offering price and that there will be a considerable degree of
underpricing. Would it not have been in the company's interest to sell its stock through one of the
methods described in this paper? While relatively obscure new issues might benefit from the certification
and marketing afforded by the underwriting process, it is hard to see how an already known business such
as Netscape would not raise higher revenues from using an auction.
It is our opinion that, while some explanations can be put forth why auctions are not today used as
the preferred method of offering corporate securities, these reasons rely largely on institutional inertia.
Indeed, the incumbent corporate underwriters possess a strong profit motive in discouraging the advent of
auctions, as they are the beneficiaries of today's substantial underpricing. And whereas auction formats
with ascending bids — which are believed to perform the best — were technologically infeasible only a
few years ago, they are eminently workable today with the rise of the Internet and other computer
communications advances.
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